CVE Database

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ash-project ash_authentication_oauth2_server allows an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust database storage and memory. The /authorize endpoint is unauthenticated by design. With Client ID Metadata Documents enabled, resolve_client/3 in AshAuthentication.Oauth2Server.CIMD fetches the document for each new URL-shaped client_id and upserts a client row, with no cap on the number of rows, no expiry or garbage collection, and no length bound on the fetched fields; the document was also placed in CIMD.Cache before validation, so even rejected documents held cache memory until their TTL. An attacker serving valid documents at many distinct URLs creates one permanent client row per URL, each able to carry multi-megabyte strings, growing storage and memory without bound. This issue affects ash_authentication_oauth2_server: from 0.3.0 before 0.3.1.

A client may send a WebSocket frame with an unknown opcode and a very large declared payload length, causing Jetty to attempt a large memory allocation and potentially exhaust the JVM heap. This occurs when auto-fragmentation is enabled, as unknown opcodes bypass the normal maximum frame size handling and payload allocation occurs before the opcode is validated.

Chroma 1.5.9 fails to validate maximum bounds on HNSW index parameters max_neighbors, ef_construction, and ef_search in collection-create requests. Unauthenticated attackers can supply arbitrarily large parameter values to exhaust server memory and cause denial of service during index compaction.

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a remote HTTP server to exhaust memory on the client host and cause a denial of service. Two HTTP/1 response-parser states accumulate server data without any cap. In lib/mint/http1.ex, decode_status_line/4 stores the unconsumed data in conn.buffer when the status line is incomplete, and decode_body/5 does the same for an unterminated chunk-extension line. Both wait for a CRLF the server never has to send, and conn.buffer is prepended to every subsequent socket message. The :max_header_list_size budget is wired only into decode_headers/5 and decode_trailer_headers/4, so neither of these states is covered by it. A malicious server, or one reached through an attacker-controlled redirect or a fetched URL, streams bytes indefinitely until the BEAM node is killed by the operating system out-of-memory handler. The chunk-extension variant is reached after a valid status line and a complete, valid header section, so an intermediary inspecting only headers sees an ordinary 200 response. This issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.10.0.

SiYuan versions before v3.8.2 contain a denial of service vulnerability in the publish-service Basic Auth throttle that stores failed-attempt state using attacker-controlled usernames without enforcing capacity limits or eviction policies. Unauthenticated attackers can submit repeated authentication requests with unique invalid usernames to exhaust memory and increase synchronization overhead, degrading service availability.

SiYuan before v3.8.2 contains a denial of service vulnerability in the unauthenticated /api/system/uiproc endpoint that accepts and retains attacker-controlled process identifiers without size limits or authentication. Attackers can send repeated requests with unique identifiers to exhaust process memory and degrade service availability.

MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 contains a denial of service vulnerability in the MOOSDB HTTP server that creates unbounded connections and threads without limits. Attackers can open many connections and send endless header data to exhaust server threads and memory, causing service unavailability.

MOOS-IvP pMarineViewer through 24.8.1 fails to limit the number of tracked node identities from NODE_REPORT messages, allowing attackers to exhaust memory by supplying unbounded distinct node names. Attackers can publish crafted NODE_REPORT data to cause memory exhaustion and stall the operator display without authentication.

MOOS-IvP uFldShoreBroker through 24.8.1 fails to limit the number of claimed communities stored in parallel vectors within ShoreBroker::handleMailNodePing(). A single publisher can supply unbounded distinct community names to grow retained state and per-pass work without limit, causing memory exhaustion and performance degradation.

MOOS-IvP pRealm through version 24.8.1 accepts unbounded REALMCAST_REQ subscriptions without validating duration or variable list limits. Attackers can register long-lived pipeways with many variables to cause pRealm to generate excessive output indefinitely, exhausting system resources.

Unauthenticated Denial of Service Attack in Migrate Guru – Site Migration &amp; Cloning <= 6.65 versions.

Unauthenticated Denial of Service Attack in MalCare Security <= 6.69 versions.

Previously, a channel registered in the mux's chanList is not usable until it is established. A malicious peer was able flood the channel's incomingRequests, deadlocking the entire connection. Now, we add an atomic established state, set when a channel becomes usable. Until such a time, handlePacket drops every packet other than the open confirmation/failure, without blocking and without tearing down the connection.

Previously, after a channel has been established, a malicious peer could send crafted messages that would deadlock the entire connection. Now, we handle all RFC 4254 channel messages; global requests are handled explicitly. Then, treat all other messages as a protocol error and tear the connection down instead of buffering and blocking.