CVE Database

Google::Auth versions before 0.06 for Perl run a command named in an external_account credentials JSON via an ungated system call. The Pluggable subclass reads credential_source.executable.command from the credentials JSON and runs it as `system($command)`, a single argument call that passes the whole string to /bin/sh -c. The executable's environment_variables map from the same JSON is copied into %ENV first. No opt-in gate guards the call. make_creds selects the Pluggable subclass whenever credential_source.executable is present, so the path is reached from the standard Application Default Credentials flow, including a "type": "external_account" configuration read from the file named by GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS. Configurations without credential_source.executable do not select this subclass and do not reach the call. Any caller that builds credentials from a configuration it does not fully control runs the embedded command with the privileges of the application process.

An OS command injection vulnerability in the openmediavault-md plugin of OpenMediaVault v8.0.4-1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands as root via injecting shell metacharacters.

The "s init" command in Serverless-Devs @serverless-devs/s <= 3.1.11 passes unsanitized user input to child_process.spawn() with shell: true. A URL ending in ".git" bypasses the only input check, allowing OS command injection when a user runs "s init" with an attacker-controlled argument.

GitPython 3.1.50 fails to recognize joined short-option forms such as -u<value> (the short form of --upload-pack=<value>) when enforcing its default unsafe-option gate. When an application passes attacker-influenced clone options into Repo.clone_from(..., multi_options=..., allow_unsafe_options=False), an attacker can supply -u<helper> to bypass the gate that blocks --upload-pack/-u, causing Git to execute the specified helper command during clone. Fixed in 3.1.51.

Wazuh workflows before 44bf114 contain a shell injection vulnerability in GitHub Actions that allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands by submitting pull requests with crafted VERSION.json files. Attackers can inject shell metacharacters into environment variables that are directly interpolated into run steps, enabling command execution and exfiltration of secrets including GITHUB_TOKEN and AWS credentials on self-hosted runners.

pgAdmin 4's Import/Export Data tool builds a psql \copy (...) command line by interpolating a user-supplied SQL query into a Jinja template and passing the rendered line to psql via --command. To stop an attacker from breaking out of the (...) wrapper, create_import_export_job() (route POST /import_export/job/<sid>, gated only by the ordinary, commonly-granted tools_import_export_data permission) validated the query with a hand-written parenthesis-balance checker, _is_query_parens_balanced(). That checker always treated a backslash before a single quote (\') as escaping the quote, i.e. as if standard_conforming_strings were off. PostgreSQL has defaulted standard_conforming_strings to on since 9.1 (2010), the default on every PostgreSQL version pgAdmin 4 currently supports (13-18); under that default psql's own \copy tokenizer treats \ as an ordinary character, so a single quote immediately after it closes the string literal. A query such as SELECT 'a\') TO PROGRAM 'echo pwned' x' was therefore accepted as "balanced" by pgAdmin's checker (which believed the ) was still inside the string), while psql, run through the actual rendered command line, closes the string at that point and treats the following ) as the end of the wrapping \copy (...) subquery, exposing an attacker-chosen TO PROGRAM '<command>' clause that psql executes via popen() -- independent of a subsequent syntax error later on the same line. This is the same class of bug as CVE-2025-12762/CVE-2025-13780 (RCE via psql meta-command/COPY injection during PLAIN-format dump restore), reached through an independently written defense in a different module (Import/Export Data rather than Restore) that had its own, different logic bug (inverted backslash-escape semantics rather than a BOM-defeated regex anchor). The fix rejects any backslash inside a single-quoted string in the query outright, rather than picking one of the two possible psql interpretations. This is intentionally conservative: because the correct interpretation of \ depends on the target server's standard_conforming_strings setting, which the checker cannot reliably know at validation time, refusing the query is safer than guessing. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from the introduction of _is_query_parens_balanced() before 9.18.