Heymrun Heym vulnerabilities

Heym v0.0.5 before v0.0.113 contains a broken access control vulnerability that allows former collaborators to keep executing JWT-auth workflows by reusing scoped workflow:execute tokens after share removal. Attackers can mint a token with a TTL up to 10 years, which the owner cannot list or revoke, and repeatedly run the workflow consuming shared credentials.

Heym before v0.0.112 contains a token leakage vulnerability in build_public_base_url() that allows unauthenticated attackers to redirect HITL review links by spoofing Origin or X-Forwarded-Host headers. Attackers can trigger anonymous workflows with forged headers so reviewer notifications point to attacker domains, capturing capability tokens to submit decisions executed with owner credentials.

Heym before 0.0.53 fails to verify the X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token header on Telegram webhook endpoints when credential_id is absent or secret_token is empty. Remote unauthenticated attackers can post forged Telegram updates to trigger workflows with the owner's configured credentials and execute actions on attacker-supplied input.

Heym before 0.0.53 fails to verify Slack request signatures when trigger nodes lack credential IDs or have empty signing secrets. Remote unauthenticated attackers can send forged Slack events to known webhook URLs to trigger workflows with the owner's credentials.

Heym versions 0.0.90 and earlier contain two server-side request forgery (SSRF) egress gaps, both remediated in app/services/ssrf_guard.py in 0.0.91. First, the LLM image-edit input loader (_load_image_bytes) fetched caller-controlled HTTP/HTTPS URLs with a bare httpx.get, applying only a scheme check and bypassing the egress-pinning HTTP client; because the workflow DSL supports "imageInput": "$userInput.body.imageUrl", a webhook or API caller can choose the fetch target when a workflow author uses that expression, allowing requests to loopback, RFC1918, and cloud metadata endpoints. Second, _is_public_address unwrapped only IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses, so IPv6 transition forms — the NAT64 well-known prefix 64:ff9b::/96, deprecated IPv4-compatible ::x.x.x.x addresses, and 6to4 (2002::/16, classified as globally routable by Python 3.11.0 through 3.11.9) — could carry loopback, RFC1918, link-local, or cloud-metadata IPv4 destinations past both the initial URL validation and the dial-time IP pin. Version 0.0.91 routes the image loader through guard_http_url and the guarded client, evaluates NAT64 and IPv4-compatible addresses by their embedded IPv4 address, and refuses 64:ff9b:1::/48, 6to4, and Teredo (2001::/32) outright.

heym, a workflow automation platform, stores and returns multiple capability secrets in plaintext in versions prior to 0.0.91. Affected secrets include webhook header-auth values (returned in cleartext by GET /api/workflows/{id} and persisted unsanitized into execution history), MCP API keys (stored as a plaintext column, returned in config/list responses, and accepted via the ?key= query string so they leak into logs, proxies and Referer headers), portal session tokens (stored and validated by plaintext equality with a 168-hour TTL), workflow execution JWTs (stored in full and re-listed by GET .../execution-tokens), Discord interaction tokens (the full interaction body is stored in execution history), and global variables. A user with read access to a workflow, share/team membership, or anyone able to read the database, a backup, or logs can recover these secrets and replay them to execute workflows or act as the secret owner.

heym before 0.0.105 fails to apply egress guards to integration services that use credential-supplied base URLs, allowing authenticated users to bypass SSRF protections. Attackers can configure credentials pointing to loopback, private, or cloud-metadata addresses and read internal service responses returned as workflow node output.

heym before 0.0.105 does not act on the result of the credential authorization lookup in the Redis workflow node (backend/app/services/node_execution/nodes/redis_node.py). When _get_accessible_credential returns None — because the credential ID does not exist or the caller is not authorized to use it — the node treats the lookup failure as an empty configuration and falls back to defaults, connecting to localhost:6379 with no password and executing the requested operation there. The same fallback occurs when an accessible credential has an empty config or no redis_host value. An authenticated workflow author who supplies a credential ID they do not own, or one that was deleted, therefore obtains a read/write connection to whatever Redis is listening on the backend's loopback interface instead of an error. Impact depends on the deployment: the stock docker-compose.yml ships no Redis, in which case the flaw surfaces as a misleading connection error rather than data exposure.

Heym before 0.0.106 contains a credential exfiltration vulnerability in the POST /api/credentials/test endpoint that allows collaborators with shared credential access to exfiltrate the credential owner's secret. Attackers can override the destination URL in the config parameter to cause the server to send decrypted authentication secrets to attacker-controlled endpoints.

heym before 0.0.109 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the Slack, Discord, and Crawler workflow nodes. These nodes issue HTTP requests to URLs taken from user-created credentials (webhook_url / flaresolverr_url) using an unguarded HTTP client, bypassing the SSRF egress guard that already protects the HTTP, WebSocket, and MCP nodes; the credential API validates only that the URL is non-empty. Any registered user can create a credential pointing at an internal address and execute a workflow, causing the backend to reach loopback, private, link-local, or cloud-metadata endpoints and return the full response body in the node output (non-blind SSRF).

Heym before 0.0.98 fails to apply SSRF egress guards to WebSocket Send and WebSocket Trigger nodes, allowing authenticated users to connect to internal services. Attackers can craft workflow nodes with arbitrary URLs and headers to reach internal services and read responses from the WebSocket Trigger node.