Jknack Handlebars.java vulnerabilities

Handlebars.java before 4.5.5 allows directory traversal. In handlebars-springmvc 4.5.3 and 4.5.4, the path-containment fix for CVE-2026-63490 validates template locations as raw percent-encoded strings, whereas the template file is opened through a URL handler that percent-decodes the path. In a Spring MVC application with a file: template prefix and a request-derived view name, a percent-encoded traversal such as %2e%2e/ bypasses both the view-resolver check and the loader-side containment and reads files outside the configured template base directory.

Handlebars.java provides logic-less and semantic Mustache templates with Java. Prior to 4.5.3, com.github.jknack.handlebars.springmvc.SpringTemplateLoader resolves attacker-influenced Spring MVC view names through Spring ResourceLoader without the path-containment validation used by other URL-based loaders. In handlebars-springmvc/src/main/java/com/github/jknack/handlebars/springmvc/SpringTemplateLoader.java, a view name using a file: or classpath: URL and ending with the # fragment delimiter places the appended .hbs suffix in the fragment, which FileUrlResource.exists() and URL.openStream() discard. HandlebarsViewResolver in handlebars-springmvc/src/main/java/com/github/jknack/handlebars/springmvc/HandlebarsViewResolver.java then passes the attacker-controlled name to handlebars.compile(), allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to read files accessible to the JVM when an application exposes a controller with a user-influenced view name. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.3.

Handlebars.java provides logic-less and semantic Mustache templates with Java. Prior to 4.5.2, applications that pass user-controlled input to Handlebars.compile() using FileTemplateLoader or ClassPathTemplateLoader are vulnerable to path traversal, allowing arbitrary file read through template names derived from URL path parameters, request parameters, or other user-controlled sources. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.2.