Koha Community Koha vulnerabilities

Koha is vulnerable to SQL injection in the Most-circulated items report. The reports/cat_issues_top.pl script (sub calculate) concatenates the user-controlled Criteria, Filter, and Limit request parameters directly into dynamic SQL. Criteria is only prefix-normalized and never validated against an allow-list, so it is inserted verbatim into identifier positions (SELECT DISTINCTROW, GROUP BY, ORDER BY, and the main calculation query). Filter values are concatenated raw into single-quoted LIKE, BETWEEN, and comparison fragments. Limit is appended raw to a LIMIT clause. An authenticated staff user with the reports module permission (not requiring superlibrarian) can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (userid and bcrypt password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), api_keys, and sessions. The issue is fixed in Koha 24.11.19, 25.05.14, 25.11.08, and 26.05.03, and in the 26.11 development branch. This is the unpatched twin of reports/bor_issues_top.pl (CVE-2026-70372).

Koha is vulnerable to OS command injection in the Task Scheduler deletion path. The tools/scheduler.pl handler accepts the jobid request parameter for op=cud-delete and passes it to C4::Scheduler::remove_at_job without validating it. Schedule::At::remove substitutes the supplied job ID into an atrm command string without quoting or escaping it and executes the command through a single-argument system() call, which invokes the shell. An authenticated staff user with the tools => schedule_tasks permission can therefore execute arbitrary operating-system commands as the Koha web/application user by supplying shell metacharacters in jobid. The issue is fixed in Koha 24.11.20, 25.05.15, 25.11.09, and 26.05.04, and in the 26.11 development branch.

An SQL injection vulnerability in Koha through 24.11.17, 25.05.12, 25.11.06, and 26.05.01 allows authenticated staff with the acquisition => order_receive permission to read arbitrary database contents via the orderby request parameter in acqui/parcels.pl. The parameter is passed to C4::Acquisition::GetInvoices, which allow-lists the column name but concatenates the direction token raw into the SQL ORDER BY clause without validation. Exploitation is blind (time-based) in production and allows extraction of patron PII, staff bcrypt password hashes, and two-factor secrets.

A stored SQL injection vulnerability in Koha through 24.11.17, 25.05.12, 25.11.06, and 26.05.01 allows authenticated staff with the tools => items_batchmod permission to read arbitrary database contents by storing a SQL payload in the agefield value of an automatic item modification rule. The agefield value is stored verbatim to the system preference and later interpolated without parameterization into a SQL query in C4::Items::ToggleNewStatus (line 1228) when the scheduled cron job executes. The injection is SELECT-only under standard MariaDB/MySQL DBI single-statement execution; a time-based SLEEP payload is also achievable via the cron trigger. An attacker can read the entire Koha database including patron PII and staff bcrypt password hashes.

Koha's guided report builder (reports/guided_reports.pl) reads the CGI parameter and, for each value, a dynamically-named parameter, and concatenates both directly into an SQL ORDER BY clause with no allowlist or validation. Since ORDER BY columns cannot be bound via prepared-statement placeholders, this requires an explicit allowlist, which does not exist.

Koha's reports/issues_stats.pl (the circulation statistics report) builds its calculation query in sub calculate by concatenating several user-controlled request parameters directly into the SQL string. The PeriodTypeSel, PeriodDaySel, and PeriodMonthSel parameters are interpolated raw into single-quoted equality and function-comparison fragments, and the Filter slots plus the Line and Column identifiers are likewise interpolated with no whitelist and no placeholder binding.

Koha's reports/bor_issues_top.pl builds dynamic SQL in sub calculate by concatenating several user-controlled request parameters directly into the query string. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), api_keys, and sessions.

Koha's reports/issues_avg_stats.pl builds dynamic SQL in sub calculate by concatenating several user-controlled request parameters directly into the query string. The Line and Column parameters are not validated against any whitelist and land verbatim in identifier positions (SELECT DISTINCTROW, GROUP BY, ORDER BY), and each Filter slot is concatenated raw into single-quoted LIKE, BETWEEN, and comparison fragments with no bound parameters.

Koha's reports/catalogue_stats.pl builds dynamic SQL in sub calculate by interpolating the user-controlled Line and Column request parameters directly into identifier positions of the query (SELECT DISTINCTROW, GROUP BY, ORDER BY) with no whitelist validation.

Koha's reports/acquisitions_stats.pl builds its per-cell statistics query in sub calculate by interpolating the user-controlled Filter request parameters directly into WHERE fragments covering aqbasket.closedate, aqorders.datereceived, aqbooksellers.name, items.homebranch, items.ccode, biblioitems.itemtype, aqbudgets.budget_code, aqorders.sort1, and aqorders.sort2.

SQL Injection in reports/catalogue_out.pl in Koha Community Koha through 22.11.37, 23.x, 24.x before 24.11.16, 25.05.x before 25.05.11, 25.11.x before 25.11.05, 26.05.x before 26.05.01, and 26.11.x before 26.11.00 allows an authenticated staff user with the Reports module flag to read arbitrary data from the Koha application database via the Filter URL parameter when the Criteria parameter matches /branchcode/.

An authenticated SQL Injection vulnerability (CWE-89) exists in the Koha staff interface in the /cgi-bin/koha/suggestion/suggestion.pl endpoint due to improper validation of the displayby parameter used by the GetDistinctValues functionality. Successful exploitation may lead to full compromise of the backend database, including disclosure or modification of stored data.