OpenStack Mistral vulnerabilities

In OpenStack Mistral through 23.0.0, several of the v2 API write paths resolve the target object with a query that can return another project's resource, then write to it. An authenticated project member can use this to rewrite and un-publish another project's public action definitions and environments. A project administrator can create a workbook whose embedded ad-hoc action or workflow name collides with a resource of another project, which moves that resource into the caller's project and causes the original owner's subsequent updates of it to fail with server errors. Only deployments exposing the Mistral API are affected.

In OpenStack Mistral through 23.0.0, the /v2/maintenance API controller clears the request context and calls the maintenance service directly without any policy enforcement. Any holder of a valid Mistral token, regardless of assigned role, can read and change the service's cluster-wide maintenance state. Setting the state to PAUSED stops processing of new workflow and execution objects across all tenant projects until an operator restores it.

In OpenStack Mistral through 23.0.0, the std.ssh_proxied action passes a caller-supplied proxy_command value directly to paramiko.ProxyCommand() before any SSH connection to a gateway or target host is attempted. An authenticated project member can use the standard action-execution API to submit an arbitrary local command as proxy_command; paramiko starts that command as a subprocess on the executor host under the executor's own service account, independent of whether the SSH connection itself ever succeeds. Only Mistral deployments that permit the std.ssh_proxied action, the default configuration, are affected.