SteeltoeOSS Steeltoe.Management.EndpointCore vulnerabilities

Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. In Steeltoe.Management.Endpoint prior to version 4.2.0 and Steeltoe.Management.EndpointCore prior to version 3.4.0, the `Sanitizer` component in the Environment actuator redacts configuration values by matching the configuration key name against a suffix list. The default list (`password`, `secret`, `key`, `token`, `.*credentials.*`, `vcap_services`) does not cover the standard .NET pattern `ConnectionStrings:<name>` or Steeltoe Connectors' `Steeltoe:Client:<type>:Default:ConnectionString`. There is no value-based scrubbing, so full connection string values including embedded `Password=` and `user:pass@host` segments are returned verbatim in `/actuator/env` responses. Steeltoe.Management.Endpoint 4.2.0 and Steeltoe.Management.EndpointCore 3.4.0 patch the issue. If an immediate upgrade is not possible: On the standard path, remove `env` from the actuator exposure list; add `.*connectionstring.*` to `KeysToSanitize` as a defense-in-depth measure for both paths; and/or require authorization on actuator endpoints.

Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. When Steeltoe management endpoints versions 3.2.2 through 3.3.0 and 4.1.0 are configured to listen on an alternate port (`Management:Endpoints:Port` is configured), the middleware responsible for restricting access to the endpoints uses the `Host` HTTP header rather than the actual network socket port. Versions 3.4.0 and 4.2.0 patch the issue. If an immediate upgrade to a patched version is not possible, add explicit ASP.NET Core authorization (`RequireAuthorization`) to all sensitive actuator endpoints as a defense-in-depth measure independent of port isolation and/or configure the reverse proxy or load balancer to enforce the `Host` header value and prevent clients from setting an arbitrary port.