Vyperlang Vyper vulnerabilities

Vyper 0.3.4 through 0.5.0b1 computes the remaining blueprint size in create_from_blueprint by uint256 subtraction without first checking that code_offset is below the blueprint's code size, so a huge offset wraps to a small positive value. An attacker controlling code_offset can make a factory deploy contracts with no runtime code, potentially trapping ETH and tokens.

Vyper 0.3.8 through 0.5.0b1 contains an optimizer miscompilation in which (msg.value | K) or (len(msg.data) | K), where K is any nonzero integer literal, is compiled to the constant 1 when used as a ternary expression branch under -O gas (the default) or -O codesize. Affected contracts use the wrong value in storage writes, arithmetic, indexes, return values, or events without warning or revert, which can record deposits incorrectly and lock funds.

Vyper 0.1.0b1 before 0.1.0b17 and 0.4.1 through 0.5.0b1 builds its source-line table with str.splitlines(), which treats characters like form feed and U+2028 as line breaks the Python parser ignores, so numeric literals are classified and validated from shifted source text. An attacker contributing source code can hide these characters in comments, strings or indentation to silently change address, integer or decimal constants.

Vyper 0.1.0b1 before 0.1.0b12, 0.1.0b14, and 0.4.1 through 0.5.0b1 mix character-based line offsets with Python's UTF-8 byte col_offset values in vyper/ast/parse.py, so multi-byte characters shift the source slices used to reconstruct later numeric literals. An attacker contributing source with non-ASCII identifiers that NFKC-normalize to ASCII, or an invisible byte-order mark, can silently substitute addresses, integers or other constants in compiled code.

Vyper from 0.1.0b4 before 0.3.0 contains a memory corruption vulnerability caused by an incorrect stack tip pointer when internal function calls are performed inside arrays. Contracts placing internal calls in nested array elements, external call arguments, struct literals, or raw_log topics can have memory corrupted, producing incorrect contract behavior.

Vyper before 0.2.9 deploys forwarder proxies through the built-in create_forwarder_to function that report a fixed 4096-byte RETURNDATASIZE rather than the actual return data size. Calls through these proxies can yield corrupted data when a function returns more than 4096 bytes without return data sanitation, and fail strict return-size checks such as SafeERC20.safeTransfer.

Vyper before 0.2.6 contains a call stack corruption vulnerability that causes incorrect function outputs when complex types with non-base members are passed as arguments. Contracts passing multi-dimensional arrays or structs to internal or external functions receive corrupted values because the compiler assumed each subtype size is 32.

Vyper from 0.1.0b4 before 0.3.0 contains a memory corruption vulnerability caused by an incorrect stack tip pointer when internal function calls appear inside tuples or nested calls. Contracts using such calls as tuple elements, call arguments, or builtin arguments like concat or ecrecover can return corrupted values or pass wrong arguments to external calls.