Appsmithorg vulnerabilities

Appsmith is a platform to build admin panels, internal tools, and dashboards. Prior to 2.1, the outbound HTTP host filter applied by WebClientUtils (used by the REST API and GraphQL datasource plugins) validates hosts against an exact-match string denylist. The comprehensive address-class check (loopback, any-local, link-local, fc00::/7) exists only on a separate code path used by SMTP, not by the HTTP plugin path. As a result, an authenticated user can craft outbound requests that reach loopback-bound services inside the container. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.1.

Appsmith is a platform to build admin panels, internal tools, and dashboards. Prior to 2.1, the bundled Caddy reverse-proxy's admin API — which has no authentication by default — is bound on 0.0.0.0:2019 inside the container. While this listener is not directly published to the host by docker-compose.yml, it is reachable from the Appsmith server process itself or a SSRF vulnerability. An authenticated low-privileged user can therefore drive the SSRF to issue POST /load (or any other admin-API call) against http://0.0.0.0:2019/, fully replacing the live Caddy configuration and taking over the reverse proxy. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.1.

Appsmith is a platform to build admin panels, internal tools, and dashboards. Prior to 1.96, a Critical Stored XSS vulnerability exists in the Table Widget (TableWidgetV2). The root cause is a lack of HTML sanitization in the React component rendering pipeline, allowing malicious attributes to be interpolated into the DOM. By leveraging the "Invite Users" feature, an attacker with a regular user account (user@gmail.com) can force a System Administrator to execute a high-privileged API call (/api/v1/admin/env), resulting in a Full Administrative Account Takeover. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.96.

Appsmith is a platform to build admin panels, internal tools, and dashboards. In versions 1.94 and below, publicly accessible apps allow unauthenticated users to execute unpublished (edit-mode) actions by sending viewMode=false (or omitting it) to POST /api/v1/actions/execute. This bypasses the expected publish boundary where public viewers should only execute published actions, not edit-mode versions. An attack can result in sensitive data exposure, execution of edit‑mode queries and APIs, development data access, and the ability to trigger side effect behavior. This issue does not have a released fix at the time of publication.