CVE Intelligence

Archive::tar Project vulnerabilities

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Published CVEs affecting Archive::tar Project products: 3 record(s), with severity, exploitation and fixes.

Exploited only (KEV) →

CVE-2026-9538 High · 7.5 CWE-789 May 25, 2026
Archive::Tar versions before 3.10 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via attacker controlled entry size field in tar header
Archive::Tar versions before 3.10 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via attacker controlled entry size field in tar header. _read_tar() reads each entry's payload with $handle->read($$data, $block), where $block is derived from the entry's 12-byte size field in the tar header with no upper bound on that value. A crafted header declaring a multi-gigabyte size causes Perl to allocate a scalar of that size.
CVE-2026-42497 High · 7.5 CWE-59 May 25, 2026
Archive::Tar versions before 3.08 for Perl extract hardlinks to attacker controlled paths outside the extraction directory
Archive::Tar versions before 3.08 for Perl extract hardlinks to attacker controlled paths outside the extraction directory. _make_special_file() passes the tar header's linkname to link() without validating it against absolute paths or .. segments, creating a hardlink that shares the victim file's inode. A subsequent write through the extracted name modifies the victim file, and the post-extraction chmod, chown, and utime block in _extract_file() (guarded only against symlinks via -l) applies the tar header's mode, owner, and timestamps to the shared inode during extraction alone.
CVE-2026-42496 Critical · 9.1 CWE-59 May 25, 2026
Archive::Tar versions before 3.08 for Perl extract symlinks with attacker controlled targets outside the extraction directory
Archive::Tar versions before 3.08 for Perl extract symlinks with attacker controlled targets outside the extraction directory. _make_special_file() passes the tar header's linkname to symlink() without validating it against absolute paths or .. segments. The secure-extract mode check that guards regular file extraction does not cover the symlink target. A subsequent open through the extracted name reads or writes the attacker chosen path.