FalkorDB vulnerabilities

A type confusion vulnerability in the _read_flags function (src/commands/cmd_dispatcher.c) in FalkorDB before 4.20.0 allows a remote authenticated attacker who can run GRAPH.QUERY to cause a denial of service and possibly disclose or corrupt memory. The function accepts a --bolt argument from any client and casts the following command argument, a Redis string object, to a Bolt client structure without checking its origin; the result-set code then dereferences pointers read from that object. The argument is parsed even when the Bolt endpoint is disabled, so default configurations are affected.

An improper authentication vulnerability in the is_authenticated function (src/bolt/bolt_api.c) in FalkorDB before 4.20.0 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute graph queries without credentials through the Bolt endpoint. The function decides whether a password is required by issuing an empty AUTH command to Redis and treats only a WRONGPASS error as meaning that a password is required; any other error, such as LOADING while a dataset is being loaded, MASTERDOWN during replication failover, or OOM under memory pressure, causes the client to be treated as authenticated. Only deployments that enable the Bolt endpoint (BOLT_PORT, disabled by default) are affected.

A stack-based buffer overflow in the _RdbLoadEntity function of the RDB graph decoders (src/serializers/decoders/*/decode_graph_entities.c) in FalkorDB before 4.18.4 allows a remote attacker who can issue Redis replication commands (for example, against an instance with no password configured) to cause a denial of service and possibly execute arbitrary code by supplying a crafted RDB stream with an attacker-controlled entity property count. The count sizes two variable-length arrays on the thread stack with no upper bound, and the decoder then fills them with attacker-supplied values.

QueryWeaver contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to obtain valid session tokens for existing accounts by submitting a signup request with a known victim email address. The signup route unconditionally creates and links a new token to the matching Identity via a Cypher MERGE operation before checking whether the email belongs to an existing account, causing the server to return a valid authenticated session token for the victim's identity without requiring any prior credentials or user interaction.