Grafana vulnerabilities

Grafana's data source proxy did not apply role-based access control to write requests forwarded to Loki data sources. A user holding only the Viewer role on an affected Grafana instance could send POST, PUT and DELETE requests through the proxy to the Loki rules API (/loki/api/v1/rules), allowing them to create, modify and delete Loki alerting rules. Because those rules are stored by Loki rather than by Grafana, the change took effect for every user of that Loki data source, not only for the Viewer who made the request. Exploitation requires an authenticated Viewer account on the Grafana instance and a configured Loki data source; no other privileges are needed. Both Grafana OSS and Grafana Enterprise are affected. The defect is in Grafana's data source proxy; Loki itself is not vulnerable and does not need to be patched.

A stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the Geomap panel's MapLibre base layer allows a user with the Editor role to execute arbitrary JavaScript in another user's session by hosting a malicious style configuration, enabling escalation to Org Admin.

The public dashboard query endpoint does not limit request body size before processing, allowing unauthenticated attackers to trigger excessive memory allocation by sending arbitrarily large JSON payloads. This can lead to denial of service through memory exhaustion. No valid dashboard access token or authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.

A user with Viewer permissions can use a path traversal in the Loki data source plugin to reach administrative Loki endpoints and read sensitive backend configuration and internal service information.

The Snowflake datasource allows for GET/PUT commands, which can allow any user with access to run queries against the data source to read/write files between the local grafana server and the connected Snowflake host.

We have released version 5.24.0 of the Grafana Operator. This patch includes a MEDIUM severity security fix for a path traversal/privilege escalation vulnerability in the Grafana Operator. ### Summary The Grafana Operator supports loading dashboards & library panels using the jsonnet data templating language. The jsonnet expression is evaluated in the context of the operator manager pod. ### Impact It is possible for a malicious user who can create Dashboard or LibraryPanel resources for a Grafana instance to obtain the Kubernetes service account token of the Grafana Operator manager. ### Affected versions All Grafana Operator versions <= 5.23 ### Solutions and mitigations All installations should be upgraded as soon as possible. As a workaround, the following ValidatingAdmissionPolicy prevent the creation or modification of jsonnet based resources: apiVersion: admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1 kind: ValidatingAdmissionPolicy metadata: name: "prevent-jsonnet-dashboards" spec: failurePolicy: Fail matchConstraints: resourceRules: - apiGroups: ["grafana.integreatly.org"] apiVersions: ["v1beta1"] operations: ["CREATE", "UPDATE"] resources: ["grafanadashboards", "grafanalibrarypanels"] validations: - expression: "!has(object.spec.jsonnetLib)" --- apiVersion: admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1 kind: ValidatingAdmissionPolicyBinding metadata: name: "prevent-jsonnet-dashboards-clusterwide" spec: policyName: "prevent-jsonnet-dashboards" validationActions: [Deny] ### Acknowledgement We would like to thank Artem Cherezov for responsibly disclosing the vulnerability.

When a user's access to mint tokens for a service account is revoked, it is sometimes still possible to do so for a few seconds after the event. The user will eventually lose access to do this.

An Editor can overwrite a dashboard not owned by them to acquire admin on that specific dashboard. The user must have write access to the dashboard to escalate privilege.

When using an IPv6 allow-list for the Auth Proxy feature, it defaults to /32 addresses. Addresses specifying a mask explicitly are not affected; to mitigate easily, add the desired mask (usually /128) to the addresses. Only auth proxy is affected; Okta, SAML, LDAP, etc are unaffected here.