Novuhq vulnerabilities

Novu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.18.0, Novu integration mutation use cases including remove-integration, update-integration, auto-configure-integration, and set-integration-as-primary look up an integration by integrationId and organizationId without consistently enforcing environmentId. A caller with access to one environment in an organization can target an integration identifier from another environment and delete the integration, modify its credentials, change the primary provider, or trigger auto-configuration. The repository advisory defines both environment API keys and dashboard sessions as affected. The 3.18.0 change enforces the environment boundary only for environment-scoped API-key authentication, while its tests intentionally retain cross-environment dashboard-session behavior, so it does not completely remediate the advisory-defined scope. Version 3.18.0 is a partial fix attempt, and the dashboard-session behavior requires curator resolution.

Novu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.18.0, Novu accepts chat webhook URLs from subscriber credentials.webhookUrl, channel endpoint endpoint.url, event payload.webhookUrl, and event overrides.webhookUrl, then passes the selected endpoint.url through send-message-chat.usecase.ts to raw HTTP requests in the Slack, Discord, Mattermost, Microsoft Teams, Grafana On-Call, Ryver, Rocket.Chat, GetStream, and Zulip providers. An authenticated user can supply an internal or otherwise restricted destination because these paths do not apply normalizeOutboundHttpUrl, assertSafeOutboundUrl, or the DNS-pinned safeOutboundJsonRequest protection used by the generic webhook providers. The Novu worker can consequently issue attacker-directed POST requests to internal network services and cause interactions or actions supported by those services. This issue is fixed in version 3.18.0.

Novu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.18.0, Novu's @novu/js In-App Inbox and the @novu/react Inbox component accept a notification call-to-action redirect.url from the v1 cta.data object and pass it through apps/api/src/app/inbox/utils/notification-mapper.ts and packages/js/src/ui/components/Notification/DefaultNotification.tsx to the navigate function in packages/js/src/ui/context/InboxContext.tsx without validating its URL scheme. An authenticated organization member or environment API-key holder can store a javascript: redirect with target _self in an in-app workflow. When a recipient using a Chromium-based browser clicks the notification, window.open executes the redirect in the current inbox-hosting origin, which can expose session material and permit authenticated actions in a customer application or the self-hosted Novu dashboard. This issue is fixed in version 3.18.0.