Printcart vulnerabilities

The Printcart Store (PCDesigner / NB Designer) plugin for WooCommerce is vulnerable to unauthenticated arbitrary file upload leading to remote code execution in all versions up to, and including, 2.9.1 The nbdesigner_copy_image_from_url AJAX action is registered for logged-out callers (wp_ajax_nopriv_), and its Google Drive branch rebuilds the destination filename from the raw, attacker-supplied gapi[name] parameter — bypassing the jpg/jpeg/png/gif allow-list applied on the other branch — and writes the fetched bytes to a web-accessible directory (wp-content/uploads/nbdesigner/temp/). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to write a .php file to a web-served, PHP-executing location and, by supplying their own Google Drive file and OAuth token as the content source, execute arbitrary code on the server. The required save-design nonce is handed to anonymous callers by the nbd_check_use_logged_in endpoint, so it presents no barrier.

The Printcart Web to Print Product Designer for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to, and including, 2.5.2 This is due to insufficient path validation in the store_design_data() function, which constructs a filesystem path from the user-supplied 'nbd_item_key' POST parameter sanitized only with sanitize_text_field() — which does not strip path traversal sequences — and then passes that path directly to Nbdesigner_IO::delete_folder() and PHP's rename(). The nonce protecting the nbd_save_customer_design AJAX action is freely obtainable by unauthenticated users via the nbd_check_use_logged_in endpoint. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible.