Rabbitmq vulnerabilities

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6, The management UI uses EJS 1.0 in which <%= ... %> does NOT HTML-escape. connection.ejs:135 renders <%= connection.ssl_details.peer_cert_subject %> (and peer_cert_issuer) directly into the page. The same pattern appears in streamConnection.ejs:102,106,110. The values come from rabbit_ssl:peer_cert_subject/1 which formats the DN as a string without HTML escaping. The verifier corrected the original researcher's claim: this is reachable only when the listener is configured with verify_peer (so the certificate must be signed by a CA in the broker's trust store, not arbitrary self-signed); however, in deployments using mTLS for client authentication, any user who can request a certificate from the organisational CA controls the Subject CN. An attacker who can obtain a TLS client certificate signed by a CA the broker trusts (with verify_peer enabled) can embed JavaScript in the certificate's Subject DN. When any administrator views that connection in the management UI, the script executes in the admin's browser session, allowing full account takeover (create users, export definitions, etc.). The management UI's CSP includes 'unsafe-inline', so inline script execution is not blocked. Preconditions include TLS listener configured with ssl_options.verify = verify_peer Attacker can obtain a CA-signed client certificate with attacker-chosen Subject (e.g. self-service corporate PKI, or rabbitmq_trust_store plugin in use) Administrator views the connection detail page. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1, rabbit_pid_codec:decompose_from_binary/1 parses a caller-supplied ETF-encoded binary and calls binary_to_atom(Node, utf8) on the node-name field. It is reached from rabbit_volatile_queue:pid_from_name/2, which is invoked for any queue name / routing key beginning amq.rabbitmq.reply-to.. The CandidateNodes membership check happens after the atom is created, and the surrounding try/catch cannot reclaim atoms (they are never GC'd). binary_to_existing_atom is not used. Any authenticated AMQP client can crash the entire Erlang VM (all vhosts, all connections) with ~1M cheap requests. Preconditions include Authenticated AMQP 0-9-1 connection to any vhost No per-connection rate limit low enough to make ~1M operations infeasible. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6, parse_array_primitive/2 for constructor 0x45 (list0) returns an element with byte-width B = 0. The enclosing array32 parser at line 148 reads a 4-byte Count from the wire and loops Count times consuming B bytes each , with B = 0, no input is consumed and the loop builds a list of Count empty elements bounded only by the 32-bit field. The SASL-mechanisms / SASL-init frame is parsed by amqp10_framing:decode_bin/1 from rabbit_amqp_reader.erl:412 before authentication completes. The pre-auth incoming_max_frame_size (default 8192 bytes) caps the frame, not the Count field, so a 19-byte payload with Count = 0xFFFFFFFF is accepted. No max_heap_size is set on the reader process. An unauthenticated network attacker can crash any RabbitMQ node that has the AMQP 1.0 listener enabled (default port 5672) by sending a single ~19-byte frame. The reader process attempts to build a list of ~4 billion empty elements, exhausting heap memory and terminating the Erlang VM. All tenants and protocols on the node lose service. Preconditions include Network reachability to the AMQP listener (port 5672, enabled by default) No authentication required. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.17, 4.0.22, 4.1.13, and 4.2.6, match_origin/1 returned the bare reflected Origin and allowed credentials even when the wildcard "" was configured, so the response echoed the attacker's origin together with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials. The affected code is rabbit_mgmt_cors.erl. When the management plugin is configured with a wildcard CORS origin (cors_allow_origins = ""), the handler reflects the request Origin back in Access-Control-Allow-Origin and also sends Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. A malicious web page that a signed-in administrator visits can then use that administrator's cached HTTP Basic credentials to issue authenticated, state-changing requests to the management API. Preconditions include The management plugin is configured with the wildcard cors_allow_origins = "*", which is an explicit operator misconfiguration A target administrator has a cached HTTP Basic-auth session in the browser. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.17, 4.0.22, 4.1.13, and 4.2.6.

The RabbitMQ Java client library allows Java and JVM-based applications to connect to and interact with RabbitMQ nodes. Prior to 5.34.0, AMQConnection.start() applies Math.min(maxInboundMessageBodySize, frameMax) after Connection.Tune negotiation even though AMQP defines frameMax value zero as unlimited and ConnectionFactory.DEFAULT_FRAME_MAX is zero. When the client default and server-negotiated value are both zero, the result is passed to Utils.framePayloadLimit(int), which interprets zero as Integer.MAX_VALUE and disables the configured maxInboundMessageBodySize cap. A malicious AMQP server, or a man-in-the-middle attacker able to modify Connection.Tune and inject frames into the connection, can then send an oversized frame of any frame type, causing Frame.readFrom() to allocate a large byte array before content-level validation and potentially terminate the client process through memory exhaustion. This issue is fixed in version 5.34.0.

RabbitMQ amqp091-go is a Go AMQP 0.9.1 client. Prior to 1.13.0, readField in read.go reads the length of an AMQP byte-array field with type tag x into a signed int32 and passes the value directly to make when allocating the field buffer. A malicious or compromised broker can encode a value such as 0xFFFFFFFF, which becomes -1 and causes a len out of range runtime panic. The panic escapes the network reader goroutine and terminates the client process, including during connection.start server properties or message header table parsing. This issue is fixed in version 1.13.0.

RabbitMQ amqp091-go is a Go AMQP 0.9.1 client. Prior to 1.13.0, Channel.recvContent in channel.go preallocates the message body slice with the uint64 ch.header.Size value supplied by an AMQP content header without capping the allocation to the negotiated Connection.Config.FrameSize value. A malicious or compromised broker can send an extreme declared body size and cause the Go runtime to attempt a correspondingly large allocation before body data is received. The allocation can exhaust memory and terminate the client process. This issue is fixed in version 1.13.0.

RabbitMQ amqp091-go is a Go AMQP 0.9.1 client. Prior to 1.13.0, Channel.dispatch in channel.go, confirms.confirm in confirms.go, and Connection.dispatch0 in connection.go synchronously send publisher confirmations, flow-control events, consumer cancellations, returned messages, including NotifyConfirm events and connection block notifications, to application-provided channels. If a listener channel is unbuffered, full, or not drained promptly, the sole reader goroutine blocks and stops processing frames, acknowledgments, deliveries, and heartbeats. Broker-driven event bursts can therefore cause connection stalls, missed heartbeats, deadlocks, and disconnection. This issue is fixed in version 1.13.0.

RabbitMQ amqp091-go is a Go AMQP 0.9.1 client. Prior to 1.13.0, PlainAuth values defined in auth.go retain passwords as exported plaintext fields in Connection.Config.SASL after a successful PLAIN authentication handshake. The Connection.openComplete method in connection.go does not clear those values. Code with access to the Connection object, including reflective loggers, application performance monitoring agents, debugging utilities, and panic handlers, can traverse the configuration and expose the credentials to logs or state captures. The credential remains available for the lifetime of the connection instead of being cleared after authentication. This issue is fixed in version 1.13.0.

RabbitMQ amqp091-go is a Go AMQP 0.9.1 client. Prior to 1.13.0, Channel.Qos in channel.go accepts negative prefetchCount and prefetchSize integers and casts them directly to uint16 and uint32 fields in the basic.qos method because validateQos is absent. Values such as -1 therefore wrap to 65535 or 4294967295 instead of being rejected. An application that permits untrusted configuration of these Qos values can unintentionally request extremely large prefetch limits, allowing a broker to deliver enough queued messages to exhaust client memory and disrupt processing. This issue is fixed in version 1.13.0.

RabbitMQ amqp091-go is a Go AMQP 0.9.1 client. Prior to 1.13.0, URI.String in uri.go concatenates CertFile, KeyFile, CACertFile, and ServerName values directly into an AMQPS query string instead of encoding them as URL query parameters with url.Values. If an application accepts a TLS asset path containing ampersand or equals delimiters and later reparses the serialized URI with ParseURI, the embedded delimiters can create or overwrite connection options, including paths to TLS certificate, key, or CA files. This can corrupt connection configuration or select unintended local cryptographic assets. This issue is fixed in version 1.13.0.

RabbitMQ amqp091-go is a Go AMQP 0.9.1 client. Prior to 1.13.0, Connection.openTune in connection.go accepts a server-advertised FrameMax below the AMQP frameMinSize value of 4096 bytes because the connection negotiation loop does not enforce the protocol minimum. A malicious or compromised AMQP broker can therefore advertise an extremely small FrameMax, causing later client publications to be fragmented into excessive numbers of frames and write operations. This can consume CPU and stall the client or its host. This issue is fixed in version 1.13.0.

amqp091-go is a Go AMQP 0.9.1 client. Before version 1.13.0, a compromised or malicious AMQP broker can force the client to allocate resources for and process content body frames that exceed the negotiated frame_max limit. This can lead to unexpected memory consumption or application-layer denial of service (DoS), bypassing the protocol's built-in framing constraints. Version 1.13.0 contains a fix. No known workarounds are available.

The RabbitMQ Java client library allows Java and JVM-based applications to connect to and interact with RabbitMQ nodes. Prior to 5.33.1, src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/ValueReader.java permits ValueReader.readTable and ValueReader.readArray to call ValueReader.readFieldValue recursively for AMQP table type F and AMQP array type A values without a nesting-depth limit. A malicious AMQP server or network intermediary can send approximately 580 nested table levels in the pre-authentication connection.start frame, fitting within the default 131072-byte frame maximum, to trigger StackOverflowError. The error terminates the client input processing thread and causes denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 5.33.1.

The RabbitMQ Java client library allows Java and JVM-based applications to connect to and interact with RabbitMQ nodes. Prior to 5.33.1, src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/ValueReader.java uses ValueReader.readBytes to accept a wire-declared contentLength below Integer.MAX_VALUE and allocate a byte array before checking the bytes available in the frame. A malicious AMQP peer can send a LongString or byte-array field with type tag S and a declared length such as 0x7FFFFFFE during the pre-authentication connection.start server-properties table, causing an approximately 2 GB allocation and OutOfMemoryError before readFully consumes data. The resulting memory exhaustion can terminate the JVM and cause denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 5.33.1.