Seaweedfs vulnerabilities

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Published CVEs affecting Seaweedfs products: 6 record(s), with severity, exploitation and fixes.

Exploited only (KEV) →

CVE-2026-100413 High · 7.0 CWE-321 Oct 14, 2026

SeaweedFS: Hard-coded SSH host key can be presented by certain standalone SFTP Helm deployments

SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. From 4.0.388 until 4.41, the SFTP Helm chart embedded one unencrypted Ed25519 private host key in k8s/charts/seaweedfs/templates/sftp/sftp-secret.yaml as stringData.seaweedfs_sftp_ssh_private_key. A standalone deployment presented that public key when sftp.enabled and sftp.enableAuth were true, sftp.existingConfigSecret was not supplied, the legacy sftp.sshPrivateKey path remained selected, a valid config-ssh Secret allowed startup, and hostKeysFolder did not provide a later Ed25519 signer. An attacker able to redirect or intercept client traffic could impersonate that SFTP endpoint to clients that trusted the published host identity, exposing password credentials or data sent to the rogue endpoint. Default all-in-one and non-authenticated standalone paths did not load the key. This issue is fixed in version 4.41.

CVE-2026-55874 High · 7.7 CWE-22 Jul 8, 2026

SeaweedFS: Path traversal in the S3 gateway X-Amz-Copy-Source header allows cross-bucket object read

SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system. Prior to 4.34, the S3 API gateway does not reject dot-dot path segments in the X-Amz-Copy-Source header used by CopyObject and UploadPartCopy, allowing an authenticated identity scoped to one bucket to read objects from other buckets through server-side copy. This issue is fixed in version 4.34.

CVE-2026-55873 Medium · 4.3 CWE-863 Jul 8, 2026

SeaweedFS: Improper authorization in the S3Tables / Iceberg REST management API lets a low-privileged S3 user enumerate administrator-owned table buckets

SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system. In versions 4.08 through 4.33, requests signed with SigV4 service s3tables are routed to the S3Tables management API where authorization collapses account-less S3 identities into the shared admin account and fails open, allowing an authenticated low-privileged S3 user to enumerate administrator-owned table bucket names and ARNs. This issue is fixed in version 4.34.

CVE-2026-58371 Low · 3.1 CWE-79 Jun 30, 2026

SeaweedFS < 4.30 - Cross-Origin Information Disclosure via Unvalidated JSONP callback Parameter

SeaweedFS before 4.30 reflects the callback query parameter verbatim into responses served with Content-Type application/javascript in the shared writeJson helper (weed/server/common.go), with no callback-name validation, no X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff header, and no CORS allow-list. Every JSON endpoint that uses writeJson - including the unauthenticated master endpoints /dir/status, /dir/lookup and /cluster/status, the volume server /status, and the filer directory listing, all reachable in the default configuration (no -whiteList, no security.toml, bound to 0.0.0.0) - can therefore be loaded cross-origin via a script tag with a chosen callback, letting a third-party web page read cluster topology, volume server URLs and gRPC ports, file identifiers, and directory listings. Because the callback string is reflected at the start of the body and no nosniff header is sent, MIME-sniffing clients may also interpret the reflected content as HTML.

CVE-2026-58372 High · 8.1 CWE-22 Jun 30, 2026

SeaweedFS < 4.34 - Cross-Bucket Object Deletion via DeleteObjects Request-Body Keys

SeaweedFS before 4.34 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the S3 gateway DeleteMultipleObjectsHandler that allows authenticated S3 principals with write access to a single bucket to delete arbitrary objects in other tenants' buckets by supplying object keys containing ../ sequences in the DeleteObjects XML request body. Attackers can bypass authorization controls through a confused deputy condition, as the validateRequestPath middleware only inspects URL-captured path variables and never examines request-body keys, allowing the filer path to collapse directory traversal sequences and resolve deletions outside the authorized bucket.

CVE-2026-54917 Critical · 10.0 Public exploit CWE-22 Jun 25, 2026

SeaweedFS S3 and Iceberg gateways path traversal

SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for object storage (S3), file systems, and Iceberg tables. Prior to 4.30, the S3 API gateway and the Iceberg REST catalog gateway construct their routers with mux.NewRouter().SkipClean(true). With path cleaning disabled, a .. segment inside the URL survives routing, so a request such as `GET /bucket-A/../evil-bucket/key`, is matched as bucket=bucket-A, object=../evil-bucket/key. The captured object key is then joined into a filer path with util.JoinPath (S3) / path.Join (Iceberg), which collapse the .. server-side, so the actual read or write lands in evil-bucket. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.30.