Snipeitapp vulnerabilities

snipe-it versions before 8.7.0 fail to validate the requestable flag for asset models in the POST /account/request/asset_model/{modelId} endpoint. Authenticated users can bypass administrative restrictions and create checkout requests for non-requestable asset models by submitting requests directly to the endpoint.

snipe-it versions before 8.7.0 fail to enforce per-instance FMCS scoping in asset audit endpoints, relying solely on query-layer filtering instead of policy-layer authorization checks. Attackers with valid sessions and assets.audit permissions could write audit log entries against cross-company assets if the query-layer scope were bypassed or refactored.

Snipe-IT versions <= 8.6.3 (fixed in 8.7.0) do not check the return value of storage write operations in ImageUploadRequest::handleImages(). Because Laravel's default disk mode does not throw on failure, a silently failed Storage::disk('public')->put(...) call still caused the application to delete the previous image via deleteExistingImage() and to reassign and persist the model's image reference to the new filename, destroying the existing image and leaving the database row pointing at a file that was never written. A mirror problem existed in deleteExistingImage(), where a failed Storage::delete() still nulled the model's image field, orphaning the file on disk. The condition is not directly attacker-controlled: it is triggered when any legitimate authenticated user submits an image upload while the storage backend transiently fails (for example an S3 network error, a local filesystem permission problem, or quota exhaustion). The result is unrecoverable loss of the prior image and a durable inconsistency between the database and disk that requires manual reconciliation. All models whose controllers route through ImageUploadRequest::handleImages (assets, asset models, users, companies, manufacturers, locations, categories, suppliers, departments, and other image-carrying models) are affected.

Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 wipe the database before validating the uploaded backup archive in the restore endpoint. Superusers uploading corrupted or invalid zip files trigger permanent data loss with no recovery path or rollback mechanism.

Snipe-IT is an open source IT asset management system. In versions up to and including 8.6.3, the report acceptance endpoints POST /reports/unaccepted_assets/sent_reminder (ReportsController::sentAssetAcceptanceReminder) and DELETE /reports/unaccepted_assets/{acceptanceId}/delete (ReportsController::deleteAssetAcceptance) are not correctly scoped when Full Multiple Company Support (FMCS) is enabled. In 8.6.3 the guard ReportsController::currentUserCanAccessAcceptance() early-exits with 'return true' when '! $user->company_id' is truthy, which is the case for every pivot-only user (a user associated with companies through the company_user pivot table whose scalar users.company_id column is NULL); versions prior to 8.6.3 lacked the guard altogether. As a result, an authenticated user holding the reports.view permission can send acceptance-reminder emails for, and permanently delete, any pending acceptance record in the install regardless of which company owns the underlying checkoutable. Deletion is destructive and forfeits the acceptance audit trail for the affected item, and the reminder email exposes limited cross-company acceptance context (item name and assignment metadata) to the recipient. Acceptance IDs are sequential integers and can be enumerated. This issue is fixed in version 8.7.0.

Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in Livewire components that enforce authorization only at the route level, not within component lifecycle methods. Attackers with a valid authenticated session can replay signed component snapshots via POST /livewire/update to invoke protected methods and escalate privileges, including creating OAuth clients, minting personal access tokens, and accessing sensitive admin data.

Snipe-IT is an IT asset management application. In Snipe-IT master-branch builds after 8.6.3 (the code was never included in a tagged release), SettingsController::downloadLocationScopingReport streams the FMCS location-scoping mismatch report (GET /admin/settings/location-scoping-report.csv) through a bare fputcsv() call without applying League\Csv\EscapeFormula, unlike the other CSV exports which honor config('app.escape_formulas'). An authenticated user with ordinary create/edit rights can place a spreadsheet formula in free-text fields that appear in the report (item name, asset tag, serial, item or location company name, location name) and arrange for the record to be FMCS-mismatched so it is included in the export. When a superuser downloads the report and opens it in Excel, LibreOffice Calc, or Google Sheets with formula evaluation enabled and external-content warnings dismissed or disabled, cells beginning with =, +, -, @, tab, or CR are executed in the victim's spreadsheet context, enabling data exfiltration (e.g., HYPERLINK/WEBSERVICE) or, on Windows Excel, legacy DDE command execution. This issue is fixed in version 8.7.0.

Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 fail to properly scope asset acceptance report queries by company, allowing authenticated reports.view users to read pending acceptances across all companies. Attackers can access the unaccepted_assets report page or CSV export to disclose cross-company inventory details and assignee names without per-row access validation.

Snipe-IT through 8.6.3 does not neutralize formula elements in the "unaccepted assets" acceptance report CSV export. ReportsController::postAssetAcceptanceReport builds the CSV by hand (stripping commas and joining rows manually) and, unlike the six sibling exports in the same controller, never applies League\Csv\EscapeFormula or honors the config('app.escape_formulas') setting. An authenticated low-privilege user with ordinary create/edit rights on any record whose free-text fields appear in the report (asset name/tag, company name, category, model, or assignee display name) can set such a field to a value beginning with =, +, -, @, tab, or CR. When a user with reports.view privileges requests the export (POST /reports/unaccepted_assets) for a pending checkout acceptance referencing the poisoned record and opens the resulting CSV in Excel, LibreOffice Calc, or Google Sheets, the injected content is evaluated as a formula in the downloader's spreadsheet context, enabling data exfiltration (e.g., HYPERLINK/WEBSERVICE) or, on legacy Windows Excel configurations, DDE command execution. Fixed in 8.7.0.

Snipe-IT 8.6.3 and earlier do not check the return value of Storage::put() when writing the signature PNG and the generated acceptance PDF in Account\AcceptanceController::store(). On filesystem drivers that return false instead of throwing on a write failure (for example the local disk with restrictive permissions, S3 with expired credentials, or a storage backend that is out of quota), execution continues into $acceptance->accept(), which sets accepted_at and the signature_filename/eula_filename fields, creates the 'accepted' action-log entry, and dispatches completion notifications even though the evidence files were never stored. The result is an acceptance record marked complete whose supporting evidence files do not exist, yielding a materially incomplete compliance artifact for EULA acknowledgement or equipment-receipt workflows. The condition is triggered when an authenticated user completes an acceptance while the storage backend is silently failing writes; an attacker cannot directly force the storage backend into that state. Fixed in Snipe-IT 8.7.0.

snipe-it versions before 8.7.0 fail to enforce asset view authorization in the GET /hardware/{asset}/barcode endpoint. Authenticated attackers can iterate asset IDs to retrieve barcodes and enumerate asset tags across tenants, including soft-deleted and cross-company assets.

snipe-it before 8.7.0 contains an incorrect calculation vulnerability in checkout request handling that allows authenticated users to corrupt the assets.requests_counter through duplicate submissions and cancellations without active requests. Attackers can repeatedly call cancel endpoints without active requests to drive the counter negative, or submit duplicate checkout requests to inflate the counter, misrepresenting pending demand in the admin queue.

snipe-it versions before 8.7.0 contain a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the ExternalUrl validation rule that fails to detect IPv6 transition addresses encoding private IPv4 targets. Attackers with super-admin privileges can configure webhook URLs using NAT64, 6to4, or Teredo transition addresses to bypass SSRF guards and access internal services or cloud metadata endpoints.

Snipe-IT before 8.7.1 fails to validate the length of the note field in the POST /account/accept/{acceptance} endpoint, allowing authenticated users to submit unbounded input that reaches synchronous CommonMark rendering. Attackers can submit large note values to exhaust PHP worker CPU and cause denial of service through resource exhaustion in the markdown parsing pipeline.

Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 gates the bulk asset restore endpoint on the assets.edit permission instead of assets.delete, allowing users without delete rights to restore soft-deleted assets. Attackers with edit permissions can post asset identifiers to the bulk restore endpoint to undo administrator deletions and bypass intended permission separation.

Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.6.2, a stored manufacturer or supplier name passed as the table component $name becomes data-selected-count-id in resources/views/partials/bootstrap-table.blade.php. Client-side code reads the browser-decoded countId, uses it as a selector, concatenates countId.substring(1) into an HTML string, and passes the string to jQuery .after(). A crafted name can therefore execute JavaScript when an authenticated user views the manufacturer detail page or supplier detail page, potentially exposing data or actions available to that session. This issue is fixed in version 8.6.2.