The-40-Thieves vulnerabilities

obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. Prior to 1.3.1, bridge tools do not consistently apply the read access-control list (ACL) to every returned field. The tasks_filter tool exposes group counts derived from denied notes, makemd_query passes unfiltered sibling result fields through, and list_templates exposes template paths and parsed user-function bodies without a read-whitelist check. An authenticated caller can consequently infer or read data from notes outside the caller's read ACL. Version 1.3.1 fixes the vulnerability by filtering path-attributable fields and applying the read whitelist to list_templates.

obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. Prior to 1.3.1, read access-control list (ACL) checks use a lexical vault-relative path while containment checks use the resolved path. An in-vault symlink under an allowed glob that resolves into a denied folder can therefore bypass the read ACL and expose files in the denied folder. Exploitation requires an out-of-band-planted symlink and does not permit an escape from the vault root. Version 1.3.1 fixes the vulnerability by applying ACL checks to the resolved vault-relative path.

obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. Prior to 1.3.1, undefined readPaths and writePaths settings allow all paths, strictReadDefault does not protect direct requests, and the .obsidian, .git, and .trash control directories are excluded only during enumeration. An authenticated caller can directly read sensitive files such as .obsidian/plugins/*/data.json, potentially exposing plugin API keys, Obsidian Sync passwords, and other in-vault data. Version 1.3.1 fixes the vulnerability by denying the control directories by default and enforcing strictReadDefault on direct request paths.