Wger-project vulnerabilities

wger is a free, open-source workout and fitness manager. Prior to version 2.6, a user with only the `gym_trainer` permission can deactivate any account in the same gym, including `gym_manager` and `general_gym_manager` accounts. The `UserDeactivateView` grants access to anyone holding any one of `gym.manage_gym`, `gym.manage_gyms`, or `gym.gym_trainer` (OR logic via `WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin`), and performs no privilege-hierarchy check to prevent a lower-privileged role from disabling a higher-privileged one. Version 2.6 fixes the issue.

wger is a free, open-source workout and fitness manager. Prior to version 2.6, five gym management views in wger apply a flawed gym-scope guard (`gym_a != gym_b`) that silently passes when both operands are `None`. A trainer with `gym.gym_trainer` and `gym.add_adminusernote` permissions and no gym assignment (`gym=None`) can read private admin notes, uploaded documents, gym contracts, user configuration, and user permission data for **any other unaffiliated user** on the instance. The subsequent querysets filter only on the attacker-supplied `member_id` with no secondary gym-scoped validation, so all records are disclosed. Version 2.6 fixes the issue.

wger is a free, open-source workout and fitness manager. In versions prior to 2.6, a gym trainer can escalate their session to any higher-privileged account (gym manager, general manager) by chaining two calls to the trainer-login endpoint. Once a trainer performs a legitimate switch into a low-privileged user, the session flag trainer.identity is set and this flag alone bypasses the permission check on all subsequent trainer-login calls. This grants full gym administration capabilities including viewing all member data, modifying contracts, managing gym configuration, and accessing other trainers' and managers' personal information. This issue has been fixed in version 2.6.

wger is a free, open-source workout and fitness manager. In versions prior to 2.6, any authenticated user can read another user's private workout session notes, exercise history, and training statistics by calling the /logs/ and /stats/ actions on a routine they do not own. The vulnerability exists in RoutineViewSet (wger/manager/api/views.py). The view defines two custom actions /logs/ and /stats/ that are intended to return data for the requesting user's own training history within a routine. However, the underlying permission check (RoutinePermission.has_object_permission) grants read access to any authenticated user when the routine has is_template=True, regardless of ownership. When the /logs/ or /stats/ actions are invoked against a routine the attacker does not own, they return the owner's private workout history, not the attacker's. This issue has been fixed in version 2.6.

wger is a free, open-source workout and fitness manager. In versions 2.5 and below, the GymConfigUpdateView declares permission_required = 'config.change_gymconfig' but inherits WgerFormMixin instead of WgerPermissionMixin, so the permission is never enforced at runtime. Since GymConfig is an ownerless singleton, any authenticated user can modify the global gym configuration, triggering save() side effects that bulk-update user profile gym assignments — a vertical privilege escalation to installation-wide configuration control. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.