Zurich Instruments vulnerabilities

The LabOne Q serialization framework uses a class-loading mechanism (import_cls) to dynamically import and instantiate Python classes during deserialization. Prior to the fix, this mechanism accepted arbitrary fully-qualified class names from the serialized data without any validation of the target class or restriction on which modules could be imported. An attacker can craft a serialized experiment file that causes the deserialization engine to import and instantiate arbitrary Python classes with attacker-controlled constructor arguments, resulting in arbitrary code execution in the context of the user running the Python process. Exploitation requires the victim to load a malicious file using LabOne Q's deserialization functions, for example a compromised experiment file shared for collaboration or support purposes.

The LabOne Web Server, backing the LabOne User Interface, contains insufficient input validation in its file access functionality. An unauthenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability to read arbitrary files on the host system that are accessible to the operating system user running the LabOne software. Additionally, the Web Server does not sufficiently restrict cross-origin requests, which could allow a remote attacker to trigger file access from a victim's browser by directing the victim to a malicious website. The vulnerability is only exploitable when the LabOne Web Server is running. Installations using only the LabOne APIs without starting the Web Server are not exposed.