Vulnerabilidades de Chainguard-dev

apko allows users to build and publish OCI container images built from apk packages. From version 0.2.0 to before version 1.4.5, UserEntry.Parse and GroupEntry.Parse in pkg/passwd read the UID and GID fields of /etc/passwd and /etc/group entries with strconv.Atoi and convert them to uint32 without a range check. On 64-bit platforms an out-of-range value such as 4294967296 (2^32) is truncated to 0, and negative values wrap. Because apko parses the passwd and group entries supplied by the packages it installs and writes them back into the image, an attacker who controls a package installed into the image can ship an entry that appears to declare an unprivileged UID or GID but is written into the built image as UID 0 or GID 0 (root). The truncated UID is also used when resolving the image's run-as user. This issue has been fixed in version 1.4.5.

apko allows users to build and publish OCI container images built from apk packages. Prior to version 1.2.7, DiscoverKeys in pkg/apk/apk/implementation.go unconditionally type-asserts JWKS keys as *rsa.PublicKey without checking the key type. If a repository JWKS endpoint returns a non-RSA key (e.g. EC), the unchecked assertion panics and crashes apko. This affects any workflow that initializes the APK database and fetches repository keys. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.7.

melange allows users to build apk packages using declarative pipelines. Starting in version 0.32.0 and prior to version 0.43.4, an attacker who can influence a melange configuration file — for example through pull-request-driven CI or build-as-a-service scenarios — could set `pipeline[].uses` to a value containing `../` sequences or an absolute path. The `(*Compiled).compilePipeline` function in `pkg/build/compile.go` passed `uses` directly to `filepath.Join(pipelineDir, uses + ".yaml")` without validating the value, so the resolved path could escape each `--pipeline-dir` and read an arbitrary YAML-parseable file visible to the melange process. Because the loaded file is subsequently interpreted as a melange pipeline and its `runs:` block is executed via `/bin/sh -c` in the build sandbox, this additionally allowed shell commands sourced from an out-of-tree file to run during the build, bypassing the review boundary that normally covers the in-tree pipeline definition. The issue is fixed in melange v0.43.4 via commit 5829ca4. The fix rejects `uses` values that are absolute paths or contain `..`, and verifies (via `filepath.Rel` after `filepath.Clean`) that the resolved target remains within the pipeline directory. As a workaround, only run `melange build` against configuration files from trusted sources. In CI systems that build user-supplied melange configs, gate builds behind manual review of `pipeline[].uses` values and reject any containing `..` or leading `/`.

melange allows users to build apk packages using declarative pipelines. In version 0.40.5 and prior, melange update-cache downloads URIs from build configs via io.Copy without any size limit or HTTP client timeout (pkg/renovate/cache/cache.go). An attacker-controlled URI in a melange config can cause unbounded disk writes, exhausting disk on the build runne. Version 0.43.4 contains a patch.

malcontent is software for discovering supply-chain compromises through context, differential analysis, and YARA. Prior to version 1.21.0, malcontent would remove nested archives which failed to extract which could potentially leave malicious content. A better approach is to preserve these archives so that malcontent can attempt a best-effort scan of the archive bytes. Version 1.21.0 fixes the issue.

melange allows users to build apk packages using declarative pipelines. From version 0.14.0 to before 0.40.3, an attacker who can influence a melange configuration file (e.g., through pull request-driven CI or build-as-a-service scenarios) could read arbitrary files from the host system. The LicensingInfos function in pkg/config/config.go reads license files specified in copyright[].license-path without validating that paths remain within the workspace directory, allowing path traversal via ../ sequences. The contents of the traversed file are embedded into the generated SBOM as license text, enabling exfiltration of sensitive data through build artifacts. This issue has been patched in version 0.40.3.

apko allows users to build and publish OCI container images built from apk packages. From version 0.14.8 to before 1.1.0, expandapk.Split drains the first gzip stream of an APK archive via io.Copy(io.Discard, gzi) without explicit bounds. With an attacker-controlled input stream, this can force large gzip inflation work and lead to resource exhaustion (availability impact). The Split function reads the first tar header, then drains the remainder of the gzip stream by reading from the gzip reader directly without any maximum uncompressed byte limit or inflate-ratio cap. A caller that parses attacker-controlled APK streams may be forced to spend excessive CPU time inflating gzip data, leading to timeouts or process slowdown. This issue has been patched in version 1.1.0.

malcontent discovers supply-chain compromises through. context, differential analysis, and YARA. Starting in version 1.8.0 and prior to version 1.20.3, malcontent could be made to create symlinks outside the intended extraction directory when scanning a specially crafted tar or deb archive. The `handleSymlink` function received arguments in the wrong order, causing the symlink target to be used as the symlink location. Additionally, symlink targets were not validated to ensure they resolved within the extraction directory. Version 1.20.3 introduces fixes that swap handleSymlink arguments, validate symlink location, and validate symlink targets that resolve within an extraction directory.

malcontent discovers supply-chain compromises through. context, differential analysis, and YARA. Starting in version 0.10.0 and prior to version 1.20.3, malcontent could be made to expose Docker registry credentials if it scanned a specially crafted OCI image reference. malcontent uses google/go-containerregistry for OCI image pulls, which by default uses the Docker credential keychain. A malicious registry could return a `WWW-Authenticate` header redirecting token authentication to an attacker-controlled endpoint, causing credentials to be sent to that endpoint. Version 1.20.3 fixes the issue by defaulting to anonymous auth for OCI pulls.