CVE-2026-65625 — Attacker-controlled AES-GCM authentication tag length allows tag forgery in jose
The pure-Erlang AES-GCM fallback in jose_jwa_aes derives the number of verified authentication tag bits from the attacker-supplied tag itself. In the {aes_gcm, Bits} clause of block_decrypt/4, the incoming tag is guarded only by is_binary/1, with no check on its length. Verification in gcm_block_decrypt/6 then computes TBits = bit_size(T) and compares only those bits of the real 128-bit tag. An attacker who controls a JWE token can truncate the authentication tag to as little as 8 bits, so only 8 bits are ever checked. This reduces forgery resistance from 2^-128 to 2^-8, and a forged ciphertext is reliably accepted as authentic within 256 attempts without knowledge of the key (an authentication tag forgery and integrity bypass). Supplying a tag longer than 128 bits instead causes a badmatch that crashes the decrypting process. The fallback is reached through the public JWE decryption path whenever AES-GCM is not provided by a native crypto NIF, for example on FIPS or stripped or older OTP builds. This issue affects jose: from 1.2.0 before 1.11.13.
Who exploits it and how urgent it is
A 0–100 score combining confirmed exploitation, ransomware and APT use, public exploits, EPSS and severity.
How the score was calculated
- EPSS 0.1% (30-day exploitation probability)+0
- Technical severity (medium)+3
The score orders the patch queue; it does not replace your asset context (internet exposure, criticality, compensating controls).
Triage
Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the sources call it.
Remediation
Fixes and mitigations documented by the sources — linked to the original advisory.
No fix documented by the sources we poll. That does not mean none exists: check the vendor advisory.
First 24 hours
Ordered from the record’s own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found. A rule-generated starting point.
- Identify exposed assets running the affected vendor/product/version combinations (Potatosalad Jose).
- No fix documented in the sources: reduce exposure and monitor the vendor advisory.
- Search available logs for exploit probes, errors and authentication anomalies.
Affected scope
Vendor, product and versions as the sources word them.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Potatosalad | Jose | ≥ 1.2.0 and < 1.11.13≥ 8848b172575fb7d7e1e2977e8ae0a21678d2157a and < 3fa1f8e3efda0da5ce6f4c9984789f979dc02740 | Vulnerable | CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP |
Attack characteristics
The CVSS vector, decoded. It describes the attack, not your exposure to it.
Every base score collected
Sources score independently and may disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.
| Score | Version | Severity | Expl. | Impact | Scored by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5.9 | CVSS 4.0 | Medium | — | — | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db via NIST National Vulnerability Database |
| 5.9 | CVSS 4.0 | Medium | — | — | EEF via CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP |
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X (score shown at the top: 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db) Weakness MITRE
Weakness class according to MITRE’s CWE catalog.
Detection
Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not tested rules.
- Local/physical vector: focus on endpoint telemetry (EDR) from affected hosts.
Timeline
What happened to this CVE, newest first.
- 2026
- Source status changed · Received → Deferred
- Affected products added · potatosalad/jose
- Record published
- CVSS changed · 5.9
- Source status changed · → Received
- Record created in this database
- CVE published
Source activity
Repeated readings are counted rather than listed.
- 1× References added · Oct 26, 2026 – Oct 26, 2026
- 1× Official description updated · Oct 26, 2026 – Oct 26, 2026
References
5 on the record
- github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/3fa1f8e3efda0da5ce6f4c9984789f979dc027
- osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65625
- github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-6gxw-6f7r-cjr6
- cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65625.html
- github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/8848b172575fb7d7e1e2977e8ae0a21678d215
Elsewhere on this site
Related CVEs (same products)
- Medium CVE-2026-65632 ECDSA signature length is not validated in jose, allowing signature malleability 1d
- Medium CVE-2026-65626 Bleichenbacher padding oracle in RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in jose 1d
- Medium CVE-2026-65627 Decompression bomb via unbounded zlib:inflate in jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2 1d
- Medium CVE-2026-65628 Infinite recursion (CPU denial-of-service) in JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2 on mismatched key types 1d
- High CVE-2026-65629 Weak PBKDF2 parameters for password-encrypted private-key export in jose 1d
- Medium CVE-2026-65631 erlang-jose RSA JWK parsing attempts to factor an attacker-controlled modulus, enabling CPU-exhaustion denial of service 1d
Not in any source we poll
Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.
- No fixed version, patch or mitigation documented.
- No CISA SSVC assessment.
- No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
- No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
- No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.
Answered from this record
Text assembled only from the fields above — no additional claims.
What should defenders know first?
CVE-2026-65625 is "Attacker-controlled AES-GCM authentication tag length allows tag forgery in jose", rated Medium. It affects Jose (Potatosalad); versions are in the scope table. It is not in CISA KEV, which does not rule out exploitation. CVSS 5.9 describes technical severity. EPSS 0.12% estimates the probability of exploitation in 30 days; neither replaces your asset context. First verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run the affected versions, apply vendor fixes or mitigations, and preserve logs for review.
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