CVE-2026-72343 — net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(), before mlx5e_open(). At that point priv->stats_nch is still zero, because it is only ever incremented in mlx5e_channel_stats_alloc(), which is reached only from mlx5e_open_channel(). mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() therefore returns 0, and kvzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16) rather than NULL. The "if (!buf)" guard does not catch this, and mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() completes "successfully" with priv->stats_agent.buf set to ZERO_SIZE_PTR. Once channels are opened (priv->stats_nch > 0) and the hypervisor enables stats reporting, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() recomputes buf_len using the new non-zero stats_nch and calls memset(buf, 0, buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR, faulting at address 0x10. Allocate the buffer based on priv->max_nch, which is set in mlx5e_priv_init() and is the upper bound on stats_nch: - Add a separate helper mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_max_size() that returns sizeof(per_ring_stats) * max(max_nch, stats_nch), and use it for the kvzalloc() in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create(). - Keep mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() (which returns based on stats_nch) for the worker's active payload size, so the wire format (block->rings = stats_nch) and the amount of data filled by mlx5e_hv_vhca_fill_stats() are unchanged. The max(max_nch, stats_nch) guard handles the rare case where mlx5e_attach_netdev() recomputes max_nch downward across a detach/resume cycle while priv->stats_nch persists (mlx5e_detach_netdev does not call mlx5e_priv_cleanup, so stats_nch is only reset when the netdev is destroyed). Without the guard, the worker could compute buf_len from stats_nch and overrun the smaller buffer allocated based on the reduced max_nch. Allocating a non-zero buffer also makes the kvzalloc() failure path in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() reachable for the first time: it returns early without (re)creating the agent. Clear priv->stats_agent.{agent,buf} in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_destroy() after freeing them, so that if a later create() bails out on this path, a subsequent teardown does not double-free the stale agent/buffer left from a previous enable/disable cycle. This mirrors the existing mlx5e pattern of preallocating arrays of size max_nch (e.g. priv->channel_stats) and lazily populating entries up to stats_nch on demand.
Who exploits it and how urgent it is
A 0–100 score combining confirmed exploitation, ransomware and APT use, public exploits, EPSS and severity.
How the score was calculated
- EPSS 0.2% (30-day exploitation probability)+1
- Technical severity (high)+6
The score orders the patch queue; it does not replace your asset context (internet exposure, criticality, compensating controls).
Triage
Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the sources call it.
Remediation
Fixes and mitigations documented by the sources — linked to the original advisory.
No fix documented by the sources we poll. That does not mean none exists: check the vendor advisory.
First 24 hours
Ordered from the record’s own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found. A rule-generated starting point.
- Identify exposed assets running the affected vendor/product/version combinations (Linux Linux).
- No fix documented in the sources: reduce exposure and monitor the vendor advisory.
- Search available logs for exploit probes, errors and authentication anomalies.
Affected scope
Vendor, product and versions as the sources word them.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux | ≥ fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 and < 3b3a552cf88e10bb7bda88b29cf1fd8267043d50≥ fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 and < 5b927dcec5f1087942bf123a82e64a3f66475f01≥ fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 and < 22c1d5ecccf92c849bdca1556179aafc95794baf≥ fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 and < 420aabb32da4381d8d7cdcaa6a77fad9eaceb0a4≥ fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 and < abc4c56427f144c96b2827a4db3b90eb5b7349a2≥ fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 and < 25f6b929c7e379cbea7cb8caa67b49b2d1efae17version 5.17 | Vulnerable | CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP |
Attack characteristics
The CVSS vector, decoded. It describes the attack, not your exposure to it.
Every base score collected
Sources score independently and may disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.
| Score | Version | Severity | Expl. | Impact | Scored by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8.4 | CVSS 3.1 | High | 2.5 | 5.9 | 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67 via NIST National Vulnerability Database |
| 8.4 | CVSS 3.1 | High | — | — | Linux via CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP |
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (score shown at the top: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67) Detection
Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not tested rules.
- Local/physical vector: focus on endpoint telemetry (EDR) from affected hosts.
Timeline
What happened to this CVE, newest first.
- 2026
- Affected products added · linux/linux
- Record published
- CVSS changed · 8.4
- Source status changed · → Received
- Record created in this database
- CVE published
Source activity
Repeated readings are counted rather than listed.
- 1× Official description updated · Oct 15, 2026 – Oct 15, 2026
References
6 on the record
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/420aabb32da4381d8d7cdcaa6a77fad9eaceb0a4
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/22c1d5ecccf92c849bdca1556179aafc95794baf
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b3a552cf88e10bb7bda88b29cf1fd8267043d50
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/25f6b929c7e379cbea7cb8caa67b49b2d1efae17
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/abc4c56427f144c96b2827a4db3b90eb5b7349a2
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b927dcec5f1087942bf123a82e64a3f66475f01
Elsewhere on this site
Related CVEs (same products)
- Critical CVE-2026-99999 ipv4: validate checksum_start before completing checksum 15h
- Unknown CVE-2026-98432 ipv4: free inet_opt and ireq_opt after an RCU grace period 15h
- Unknown CVE-2026-98431 RDMA/uverbs: Fix mmap_lock/disassociation_lock circular dependency 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98430 RDMA/efa: Keep admin queues alive while IRQ is registered 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98429 RDMA/efa: Keep EQ resources alive while IRQ is registered 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98428 ALSA: usb: 6fire: Avoid embedded URBs 1d
Not in any source we poll
Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.
- No fixed version, patch or mitigation documented.
- No CISA SSVC assessment.
- No CWE classification.
- No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
- No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
- No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.
Answered from this record
Text assembled only from the fields above — no additional claims.
What should defenders know first?
CVE-2026-72343 is "net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation", rated High. It affects Linux (Linux); versions are in the scope table. It is not in CISA KEV, which does not rule out exploitation. CVSS 8.4 describes technical severity. EPSS 0.20% estimates the probability of exploitation in 30 days; neither replaces your asset context. First verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run the affected versions, apply vendor fixes or mitigations, and preserve logs for review.
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